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FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

(D., MONTANA)

before the
Missouri Bar
Muchlebach Hotel, Kansas City, Missouri
Thursday, September 7, 1967
11:00 a.m. (CDT)

TROUBLED TIMES

There are, I am advised, about a thousand lawyers at
this conference .

A lot of lawyers.

But if my calculations are cor-

rect, this large gathering forms only .003% of the legal profession
in the United States .
To a non-lawyer who happens to be a la\'T- maker, the
thought of 300,000 lawyers gives rise to a most uncomfortable
question.

How can we, in the Congress, who are so few generate so

much business for so many?

I find even more appalling the possi-

bility that the necessity for so many lawyers may be related to the
quality of the product of the law- makers.
Be that as it may, I do know that law- makers and
lawyers share a common endeavor and a common hope .

We work to
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strengthen the nation and the freedom and well-being of its people
within a frame\'rork of law.
This joint effort is confronted in 1967 with a
challenge whose character is pecularly of our own times even if it
has been of many times in the making.

We are living through a long

night of violence both at home and abroad .
hostility is heard throughout the nation.

A harsh antiphony of
It rises out of the

ordeal of VietNam and is echoed in the turbulence of the nation's
cities.
The sound of violence does not set well with me or
with you who are trained to seek peaceful and orderly solutions to
disputes .

Nevertheless, as a nation we have become so jaded by the

continuous violence of our times that the sense of indignation appears dulled except at moments of fierce fury when a great city
goes up in flames.
It takes a Detroit to arouse the nation .

But Detroit

took a toll of 43 dead and brought injury to more than 1,000 people,
many of whom were peaceful bystanders .

For 5 days the over-all

- 3 casualties in Detroit ran at a higher rate than those which, of
late, have been suffered by American
~lliile

for~es

in Viet Nam .

Detroit burned, it was not uncommon to hear

expressed as a remedy for rioting, less coddling and more crudgelin[
That remedy on a massive scale is thought by some also t o provide a
way out of the difficult y in Viet Nam .
Experience has demonstrated, however, that it would
be as futile as it is dangerous to yield to an easy indulgence of
that kind at home or abroad.

In the urban areas of the nation no

less than in Viet Nam an abject reliance on force is a formula not
so much for solutions as for stret ching a summer of seething dis order into an autumn of simmering discontent and so on , from season
to season and year to year .
The cure of urban ills involves something more than
force, even as force is essential in the restoration of an or der
which has broken down .

On that subject, let me say that fo r too

long, we have expected too much for too little from the police of
the nation .

The police are more often than not underpaid ,
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Indeed, it is not un-

usual to hear the cry of "police brutality'' while a policeman is
being hit over the head.
A well- trained and disciplined police and the avail ability of a graduated supplement of force is an essential characteristic of every orderly society in the world .

Anyone who makes

light of the dangerous and difficult work of the police makes light
of his own life and of civilized survival .
The safety and order of the community is the first
responsibility of organized government .

On that score, there can

be no uncertain trumpet and, insofar as the federal government is
concerned, there is no uncertain trumpet.

President Johnson has

made perfectly clear that r iots will not be tolerated and rioters
will not be rewarded .

I want to say that insofar as the recent

crises in the cities are concerned, the President has acted, in
my judgment, with a blend of a firm resolve in the face of violence
and a wise understanding of the plight of the urban areas.
Riots have been suppressed; they wj_ll continue to be
suppressed.

Rioters have not been rewarded; they will not be

re~
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We do not reward rioters when

we improve the diet, the education, and the health of little children .

~Te

do not re\'rard rioters when we stimulate the building of the

kind of housing and neighborhoods in which people can live decently
and safely.

We do not reward rioters when we try to curb air pollu-

tion and assure a plentiful supply of pure water in metropolitan
areas .

We do not reward rioters when we seek to protect infants

from rats.
It is one thing to reject rioting.

It is another,

however, to turn our backs on the difficulties of the urban areas
because riots have occurred in them.
before the riots.
now .

Those difficulties were there

They were there during the riots.

They are there

The nation's responsibility for confronting these difficulties

existed before the riots.

It existed during the riots .

It exists

now .
It is my good fortune to come from a State where the
standard ills of pollution, delinquency, ghettos and the like are
not yet fixed institutions .

Yet, the serious decay of urban America
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it is to all Americans wherever they may live .
The time is past, if it ever existed, when one part
of the American community could ignore with impunity to itself,
serious problems in the others.

The fact is that distinctions of

rural and urban are fast losing significance in this nation.

Ameri-

cans are moving in increasing numbers into and around the cities of
the nation.

By the year 2000, 150 million Americans will have been

added to the population of the United States and it is anticipated
that most of the increase will be housed in great metropolitan
complexes.
That is but one relevant statistic .

There is no end

to other statistics which will tell us what we already know about
the urban problem .

They will tell of the disintegration of the

physical environment by pollution of air and water.

They will tell

of the trek of the improverished into the central cities and the
flight out of those with means.

They will tell of the grim discon-

tent that stalks the streets of the slums, of the lack of employment
opportunities therein and of the accumulation of the permanently
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They will tell of the massive breakdown of family

life, inadequate schools and poor recreation facilities .
tell of miserable housing , hunger, and rats .

They will

Statistics will tell ,

in sum, in modern mathematical idiom, an ancient story of human
poverty, neglect and degradation.
Ther e has indeed been a long night of violence in
the cities of the nation .

There has also been a long night of

neglect of the needs of the cities.
That is not to say that an effort has not been made ,
in a paraphrase of the words of John Fitzgerald Kennedy,
the cities moving again . 11
forts in this direction.

11

to get

We owe a great deal to him for his efWe owe a great deal to Lyndon B. J ohnson

in continuing and expanding the effort and, also, to his insistence
that the effor t be realistic in a financial sense .

Under his leade1

ship, and in cooperation with Congress, many federal stimulants hav£
been applied boldly and broadly in an effort to revive the urban
centers .
These efforts have cost a great deal of money .
are going to cost more .

They

We are properly concerned with these costr

- 8 and with the effectiveness of the efforts.

We can properly inquire

into the great number of programs which have put into operation in
the last few years .

May I say that I have advocated for several

years a more vigorous exercise of legislative revlew by the Congress
in this connection .

And var ious Senate committees are proceeding

with the job of evaluating, adjusting and improvir.g this vast body
of legislation.
It will help to keep a perspective in this process,
however, if we note that the cost of the federal programs which are
directed heavily at the urban and other social ills of the nation
run to billions a year less than the cost of the Viet Nam war and
are but a fraction of the budget of the Department of Defense which
now reaches an over- all annual figure of about $70 billion .

As we

have been prepared to make the effort for security of others abroad
and particularly the security of Viet Nam, we must also be prepared
to act for the inner security and stability of the nation.

- 9 For those of us who do not live in cities, no less
than for those who do, there is a need to recognize that the way
to restrain the mushrooming of violence is to defuse the seething inner cores of the metropolitan areas.

As I have already

noted, there can be no uncertain trumpet when the safety and
order of the community are challenged .

But the trumpet would

sound a hollov1 note, indeed, if it blew over devastated community
after devastated community throughout the nation .
As in the cities, so in Viet Nam , there has been
from the outset of the involvement almost universal agreement
that a rational solution in Viet Nam is not attainable by force
alone .

Nevertheless, the reliance nn fo r ce has grown, escalation

by escalation, until now there are few, if any raticnal military
steps left to take within Viet Nam .

Vlhat v1as still a primitive

war among Vietnamese a fe\'r years ago has grown by successive
and mutual increases in the application of force to the point
where it has become a devastat:lng war, fought with a great range
of modern weapons .

It has become a war, moreover, which now
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finds the United States in the foreground, and our vietnamese
and other allies in fue background, against North Vietnamese and
the v:·.et Cong in the foreground opposite and with China and
Russia in the background opposite .
As late as May 1965, there were still only 45,000
U. S. troops in Viet Nam .
number was 400,000.

A year and a half later, hm'iever, the

Today it stands at over 450,000 and the

commitment is expected to grow to approximately 525,000 in mid1968 .

These figures do not begin to take into account the tens

of thousands of men in units of the 7th Fleet in Vietnamese water
nor the back-up forces in Okinawa and elset'ihere, nor the heavy
bomber squadrons flying out of Guam and Thailand .
The input of more than half a million American
soldiers into the Vietnamese conflict does not mean that the
end of the war is in sight.

The end is not even in sight insofar

as the demand for more men and more resources is concerned.
There is talk of the need for one or two more divisions of troops.
There is talk of sending Americans into the delta of the Mekong
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River south of Saigon,

~rhich

is the Viet Cong stronghold and has

heretofore been tre responsibility of the South Vietnamese Army.
There is pressure to enlarge and intensify the bombing of North
Viet Nam even though

u.s.

planes have already flown to within

30 seconds of the Chinese border on bombing missions .
I do not know how much of the potential for an
enlarged involvement in Viet Nam will materialize except that on
the basis of experience to date, the only reasonable conclusion
is that escalation will beget escalation .

I do know that there

is no reason to assume t hat additional air action will achieve
what air action was supposed to have achieved months ago but
has not achieved; that is, a cut off of supplies and men moving
south and the bringing of Hanoi to the peace table .
I do know that when the great build- up of U.

s.

forces began in mid-1965, the regular South Vietnamese army was
suffering eight combat deaths for every American killed in action .
In 1966, that ratio had dropped to two South Vietnamese for each
American.

This year, American combat deaths are on a one-for-one
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basis \'lith the South Vietnamese forces and the total of U. S.
dead and wounded in the Viet Nam conflict now approaches 100,000.
The costs of the war, too, have risen with the
expanded involvement .

About this time last year, with 235,000

American troops stationed in Viet Nam, the annual cost was estimated at $13 billion, or slightly more than $1 billion a month.
At year's end, the annual rate of expenditure for VietNam was
at an estimated $21 billion or nearly $2 billion a month.
Today, it is generally calculated that monthly costs are at
least $2 . 5 billion .
I do not know where a solution for Viet Nam may
lie or of what it might consist.

I can only say that I know

where it does not appear to lie and of what it does not seem to
consist.

In my judgment, peace does not liB in ever additional

inputs of U.

s.

forces or in ever expanding bombing forays .
This is not a new view for me.

I have felt that

such was the case v1hen there were less than 50,000 Americans in
Viet Nam .

I say it now when there are close to 500,000 .

After

- 13 a mission to Viet Nam in the company of several Senate colleagues,
almost two years ago, we reported that the question which confronts
this nation in VietNam
U.

s.

11

•••

is not one of applying increased

pressure to a defined military situation but rather of

pressing against a military situation i'lhich is, in effect, open
ended.''
Despite the new current of rumors in Washington
and elsewhere that the enemy is 'on the ropes," or that we are
"over the hump," I can see no reason to discard the premise that
the war in Viet Nam is open-ended--that the

logic~l

sequence of

greater U. S. involvement is still greater involvement , and so
on, until the monster of war runs amuck over the entire Southeast
Asian mainland, if not throughout the world .

Behind the guerrilla

war in South Viet Nam, there are still the largely unengaged forces
of North VietNam's commander Vo Nguyen Giap.

And beyond North

Viet Nam, if we need to be reminded, there is China.
Therefore, I share \'Ti th the President and
many others the view that the dilemma of Viet Nam, in

..
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To date, all efforts to initiate

negotiations, however, have been in vain .

Over the months many

alternative approaches have been suggested.

I have had occasion,

for example, to urge neutralization of all of Southeast Asia and
a cease-fire and standfast in Viet Nam.

All- Asian negotiations

and direct U. S. - Chinese meetings have been proposed.

I have

advocated that a defensive barrier be built across Viet Nam just
south of the demilitarized zone and extended across Laos to Thailand
as an alternative to an extension of the war in Asia in consequence
of ever- expanding aerial bombardment.

In connection, therewith,

I have joined Senator Cooper of Kentucky and others in advocating
a contraction of bombing to the routes of infiltration in the
vicinity of the 17th parallel.
Finally, it has been suggested time and again that
the United Nations Security Council might at least initiate a
consideration of the question of Viet Nam .

The Council has not

•
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it has failed even to ackno·Nledge, in an

official sense , the existence of the Vietnamese conflict as a
threat to the peace.

A future reader of official U. N. papers

for this trying period in world history would scarcely be aware
that a major war had occurred in Southeast Asia .

That would be

the case unless he read the personal papers of the Secretary General
U Thant has sought to act on his own initiative i n his diplomatic
capacity to end the \'lar .

However, the provisions of the Charter

involving the peace-keeping functions which bind the member-nations
have not been engaged .
Let me make clear that the U. N. should not be
expected to produce miracles of solution with respect to Viet Nam,
inasmuch as all the other avenues, which have been tried, have so
far come to dead ends.

The world organization, however, does have

a mandate regarding the preservation of peace .

The members of the

Security Council, including the United States, do have a compelling
responsibility under the United Nations Charter.

•
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requires the organization to '·take effective collective measures
for the prevention and remova 1 of threats to the peace •.•. "
Hi th all due respect, it does not take a la\•TYer to interpret
this solemn commitment and the responsibility which it places
on the United States and all other members of the Security Council
The vehicle for bringing the question of Viet Nam
before the Council is already present in the form of a U.

s.

resolution which was introduced at the beginning of the year .
It has not yet been called up in the Council for reasons which
are far from clear .

Yet the procedural question of calling up

is subject to vote and it is veto-proof under the precedents .
Moreover, the precedents are there which would allow involved
parties that are not members of the

u.

N. to participate in the

consideration and that, too, on the basis of precedent is not
vetoable .

In sum, Peking can be included; Hanoi and Saigon can

be included; and so too, for that matter if the Council so
decides, can the National Liberation Front or any other pertinent

•
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•
nation or group.

You may recall that Peking did appear before

the Council some years ago in connection with the Korean question.
You may recall, too, that in the original Palestine dispute in

1948, two non-governmental groups--the Jewish agency for Palestin
and the Arab Higher Committee--were invited by the Council to
present their case and the former did appear .
In recent weeks twenty-seven Senators, including
Senators Symington and Long have joined in urging that the United
States government insist that its resolution on Viet Nam be laid
before the U. N. Security Council and, that if necessary, a vote
be had- - win or lose--on the question of taking up .

In our judg-

ment, it is long past the time for the member states and all
others involved in Viet Nam to stand up and be counted .

At this

late hour, \ve need to know and the world needs to know· who is
prepared and who is not prepared to move to bring the military
struggle to a close without delay and, thereafter, to seek a
resolution of the issues of Viet Nam by peaceful processes .
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The long night of violence in Viet Nam will know
no dawn until the \'TOrld community can end the diplomatic inertia
\'lhich has characterized its reaction to Viet Nam.

Until the war

is brought to an end, moreover, the hope of removing the roots
of disorder in our cities may well remain beyond our reach.

